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Abstract
We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion
environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise.
We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about
a project’s value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or
two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusion, the multiexpert
organization dominates the single expert organization. However, this ranking is
reversed when the experts can collude among themselves (horizontal collusion) and
with the principal (vertical collusion).
JEL classification: D81; D82; D86; L23
Keywords: Expertise, Organization, Collusion
Running title: Collusion and Delegated Expertise
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1 Introduction
With scientific and technological boundaries moving constantly, decision-making has come to
rely increasingly on expertise. Decision-makers do not always have the time and skills to gather
and process information on complex issues. Instead, this task is often delegated to experts.
How can one ensure that experts provide accurate information? How accountable should
experts be for their recommendations? How should the delegation of expertise be organized?
Should one rely on one or several experts? Should the experts’ reports be public or private?
To address these issues, one must realize that delegated expertise involves an incentive prob-
lem between principals and experts, with specific features. Indeed, because experts produce a
non-verifiable output, namely information, they must be given incentives not only to acquire
information, but also to report it truthfully. An efficient design of incentives for experts must
therefore solve an intricate problem mixing both moral hazard and adverse selection.
We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts and the organization of dele-
gated expertise in different collusion environments. We consider a principal relying on experts
to gather and report two signals about a project’s value. The principal can have a single expert
gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We focus on how the experts’ ability
to collude among themselves (horizontal collusion) and/or with the principal (vertical collusion)
affects the relative performance of these two organization forms. We show that absent collu-
sion, the two-expert organization dominates the one-expert organization, but that this ranking
is reversed if both horizontal and vertical collusion are simultaneously possible.
The model is as follows. A risk-neutral principal has a project with two possible outcomes:
success or failure. To decide whether to undertake it, he gains access to two noisy signals. The
signals are independent conditional on the project’s outcome and otherwise identical. Each
signal can take two values, positive or negative, and the project is valuable only if both signals
are positive. For simplicity, both signals have to be gathered simultaneously.
The principal does not have direct access to the signals. Instead, he must hire one or two
risk-neutral experts to gather and report the signals. This task being costly, the experts must
be motivated with incentive contracts. The incentive problem is compounded by the fact that
reports are fully manipulable, i.e., they need not coincide with the signals observed, and that the
experts have limited liability. This allows the experts to derive rents. We study and compare
the rents under the two organization forms, i.e., one vs. two experts.
We first study the one-expert/two-signals case. A priori, contracts specify transfers con-
tingent on both reports (each being positive or negative) and the project’s outcome (success,
failure or rejection). However, because reports are manipulable, the contract cannot distinguish
between the expert having observed two negative signals and his having observed one positive
and one negative signal. The principal can only use outcome-based contracts. We identify a key
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property of delegated expertise: diseconomies of scale due to agency costs. That is, the expert’s
rent with two signals is more than twice his rent with just one signal. Indeed, because he is
rewarded when his report pair is confirmed by the outcome, an expert is reluctant to gather a
second signal because it might conflict with the first one. Motivating the expert to gather more
information is increasingly costly for the principal. To reduce agency costs, the principal may
forego the benefit of more information and make less than optimally informed decisions.
We then consider the two-experts/two-signals case assuming no collusion. An expert’s con-
tract can specify transfers contingent not only on his own report but also on the other expert’s,
and on the outcome. Such report-based contracts can exploit the signals’ correlation through
cross-checking: The optimal contract is for each expert to be rewarded only if his report is con-
firmed by the outcome and if it coincides with the other expert’s. This yields economies of scale
due to agency costs, which implies that absent collusion, the optimal organization of delegated
expertise is for the principal to rely on two experts rather than one.
The performance of the two-expert organization is however sensitive to the collusion envi-
ronment. Indeed, contracts rewarding consensus might invite horizontal collusion, i.e., experts
might collude to avoid making conflicting reports. Such contracts are also exposed to vertical
collusion: The principal may be tempted to bribe an expert into making a report that conflicts
with the other expert’s so as to reduce the latter’s compensation. Note that horizontal collu-
sion will arise naturally when communication between experts cannot be restricted, and vertical
collusion when the principal cannot commit to publicly release the experts’ reports.
When experts choose jointly whether to gather information (ex ante horizontal collusion),
the two-expert organization remains optimal. When experts can coordinate their reports after
having gathered information (ex post horizontal collusion), either organization form can be
optimal depending on conditions we characterize. When only vertical collusion is possible,
collusion-proof contracts are own-report-based, i.e., contingent on the outcome and the expert’s
own report but not on the other expert’s. In that case, the two-expert organization dominates
the one-expert organization, but agency costs imply only constant returns to scale. Finally, when
both horizontal and vertical collusion are possible, collusion-proof contracts are outcome-based,
and the organization forms’ ranking is reversed: The one-expert organization is optimal.
Summarizing, the structure of agency costs for delegated expertise calls for using multiple
experts. However, the benefits of such an organization depend on the scope for vertical and hori-
zontal collusion. Without public and transparent reporting, relying on multiple experts may even
be counterproductive. The one-expert organization’s optimality is striking. While horizontal
collusion allows two experts to behave as one vis-à-vis the principal, the two-expert organization
is vulnerable to vertical collusion, which is impossible in the one-expert organization.
The design of expertise is well studied in Administrative Law (Hermitte [16], Harrison [15])
and Accounting (Baiman and Demski [1]), but less so in Economics. One can organize the
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relevant Economics literature along the steps of our analysis.
First, we study agency costs for one expert collecting information for a principal. This
builds on Lambert [27], Demski and Sappington [7] and Malcomson [33] who study this prob-
lem under fairly general information structures. Our information structure is less general with
discrete signals, decisions, and outcomes. However, with the risk-neutrality and limited liability
assumptions, it makes our model tractable, allowing an extension to two experts.
Second, we compare agency costs for the one-expert and the two-expert organizations. This
issue is related to recent organization theories. The adverse selection literature stresses that
when agents are privately informed about their costs of doing complementary tasks, rents can
be lower under centralization, i.e., in the one-agent organization (e.g., Baron and Besanko [3,4],
Gilbert and Riordan [13], Laffont and Martimort [24], Dequiedt and Martimort [9]). The moral
hazard literature yields similar results: As one agent performing two independent tasks can be
rewarded when both succeed, rents are less than for two agents (Laux [28]). Instead, specific
features of delegated expertise imply diseconomies of scope due to agency costs. The multi-
dimensional adverse selection problem that arises with one expert is harder to solve.1 This
problem spills over onto the signal gathering stage, creating endogenous diseconomies of scope
outweighing the endogenous economies of scope stressed in the moral hazard literature.2
Third, we study collusion. Ex post horizontal collusion increases the cost of eliciting con-
flicting signals from two experts. This contrasts with the pure adverse selection literature where
horizontal collusion (under asymmetric information) can be avoided at no cost (Laffont and
Martimort [26], Che and Kim [5]). While vertical collusion is relevant beyond expertise, it has
not received a general treatment in the literature, to our knowledge.
In Dewatripont and Tirole [10], one signal can be misreported only as being positive, and
the other only as being negative. They show that with decision-based contracts the incentives
for gathering two signals interact, making the two-expert organization optimal. Our mechanism
design approach shows how horizontal and vertical collusion endogenize outcome-based (rather
than the coarser decision-based) contracts. Absent collusion, conflicting signals are nevertheless
easier to elicit with two experts. With collusion, however, a single expert can be optimal.
Sections 2 and 3 set up and study the one-expert/one-signal case. Section 4 studies the one-
expert/two-signals case. We identify the optimal organization absent collusion (Section 5) and
in various collusion environments (Section 6). Section 7 studies extensions. Section 8 concludes.
1See Mookherjee and Tsumagari [35] and Severinov [38], as well as Laffont and Martimort [25].
2 In a pure moral hazard setting, with exogenous synergies between tasks, complementary (substitute) tasks
should be centralized (separated) (Holmström and Milgrom [19,20], Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [32], Itoh
[21], Ramakrishan and Thakor [37]). However, this incentive effect is also mixed with better risk sharing under
centralization, an issue we avoid by assuming risk-neutrality.
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2 A Model of Delegated Expertise
Consider a decision-maker (principal) and an agent (expert) whose task is to gather information
on a risky project. Based on this information, the principal decides whether to undertake the
project. Both the principal and the expert are risk-neutral. The expert is unbiased, i.e., a priori
indifferent about whether the project is undertaken and about its outcome, and responds only
to monetary incentives. (Section 8 discusses biased experts and non-monetary incentives.) The
project’s payoff is S¯ > 0 if it succeeds, and S < 0 otherwise. Denote ν the prior for a success.
By incurring a personal cost ψ, the expert observes a signal σ ∈ {σ, σ¯}. Denote by θ ∈ (1/2, 1]
the signal’s precision defined as Proba(σ¯|S¯) = Proba(σ|S) = θ. Hence, σ¯ is “good news” and σ
“bad news” about the project. If the project is undertaken, its outcome is observed. Otherwise,
its outcome is not observed (Section 7.1 studies the case in which it is).
Denote p(σ) the likelihood of σ ∈ {σ, σ¯} and ν(σ) the probability of success conditional
on σ. More generally, we denote p(ω) the probability of an event ω. For example, p(σ¯) =
νθ + (1 − ν)(1 − θ) and ν(σ¯) = θννθ+(1−ν)(1−θ) . We assume that absent further information,
undertaking the project is inefficient:
νS¯ + (1− ν)S < 0. (1)
but that a favorable signal makes the project valuable:
ν(σ¯)S¯ + (1− ν(σ¯))S > 0. (2)
First-best decision rule: Once ψ is sunk, the optimal decision rule is to undertake the project
if and only if σ = σ¯. Hence gathering information is valuable if this is cheap (ψ small) enough,
and the signal precise (θ large) enough. The project’s expected net surplus is:
p(σ¯)
¡
ν(σ¯)S¯ + (1− ν(σ¯))S
¢
− ψ = θνS¯ + (1− θ)(1− ν)S − ψ ≥ 0.
3 Expertise and Incentives
This section describes the incentive issues arising in the principal-expert relationship. Departing
from the first-best, three contracting frictions are assumed.
Assumption
(i) Moral hazard: Whether the expert acquires information or not is not observable.
(ii) Limited liability: Transfers from the principal to the expert are non-negative.
(iii) Soft information: The signal σ is not observable by other parties.
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Point (i) implies that the expert must be given incentives to gather information. Point (ii)
implies that incentive provision is costly for the principal. Without limited liability, the expert
could be made residual claimant for the project. In particular, if the project fails after a positive
report, the expert would have to pay the principal. Instead, under limited liability, incentive
provision requires leaving an information rent to the expert. Point (iii) implies that the expert
has private information. The expert produces information, a non-verifiable and fully manipulable
output. In particular, he can report having observed a signal even if he has not. This feature
distinguishes expertise from most other productive activities since output is generally observable.
A contract for the expert consists of transfers from the principal, and decisions whether
to undertake the project based on his report σˆ on the signal. The project being risky, the
transfers can be lotteries conditional on its outcome. Such lotteries are useful only if the project
is undertaken. Otherwise, a constant transfer suffices. Formally, a contract is a menu of lotteries
on transfers and a vector of decisions depending on the expert’s report σˆ ∈ {σ, σ¯}.
We begin by characterizing the optimal contract implementing the first-best decision rule.
Such a contract is summarized by the expert’s transfers t0 if the project is rejected, t¯ if it is
undertaken and succeeds, and t if it fails. To streamline the presentation, we assume that t = 0,
which is clearly optimal (see the Appendix for a proof).
Absent the incentive problem, the ex post information asymmetry between the principal
and the expert could be solved at no cost with a flat contract since the expert is a priori
unbiased. A flat contract does not work, however, when the expert must be induced to gather
information. Indeed, he would remain uninformed and report any signal. Therefore the expert
must be motivated to collect a signal, and to report it accurately, i.e., the problem combines
moral hazard ex ante and adverse selection ex post.
Summarizing, the expert should neither prefer reporting σ after having observed σ¯, i.e.,
ν(σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0, (3)
nor reporting σ¯ after having observed σ, i.e.,
t0 ≥ ν(σ)t¯. (4)
The contract must also satisfy a moral hazard incentive constraint for the expert to gather
information. The expert must not prefer remaining uninformed and reporting either σ, i.e.,
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ t0, (5)
or σ¯ (in both cases his belief remains ν), i.e.,
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ νt¯. (6)
These two constraints imply the adverse selection constraints (3) and (4). For intuition, suppose
the expert prefers reporting σ even after observing σ¯ (i.e., constraint (3) is violated). Then he
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would report σ irrespective of the signal. But if the expert is not going to use the signal there
is no point his paying ψ to collect it (in particular constraint (5) is violated). Similarly, if
constraint (4) is violated then the expert would report σ¯ regardless of the signal, in which case
there is no point his paying ψ to collect it (in particular constraint (6) is violated).3
The expert’s participation and limited liability constraints p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯ + p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ 0,
t¯ ≥ 0, t0 ≥ 0 are always satisfied in the environments below and they are omitted henceforth.
To implement the first-best decisions at minimum cost, the principal solves:
min
{t¯,t0}
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 subject to (5) and (6).
Denote t1,1, t¯1,1, t1,10 and U
1,1 the optimal transfers and rent.
Lemma 1 The optimal incentive contract implementing the first-best decision rule rewards
(resp. punishes) the expert when he makes a positive report and the project succeeds (resp.
fails). The optimal transfers are as follows:
t1,1 = 0, t¯1,1 =
ψ




(1− ν)(2θ − 1) . (7)





(1− ν)(2θ − 1) . (8)
The contract is simple. If his report is positive, the expert is rewarded only if the project
succeeds. This motivates him to learn and report a positive signal. The expert is also rewarded
for a negative report, motivating him to learn and report a negative signal. This feature is usual
in moral hazard settings: An agent’s rewards should be linked with the outcomes that are most
informative about his having exerted effort, here about his having gathered information.
The rent’s expression is also intuitive. First, the principal controls the expert thanks to the
signal’s precision (here p(σ¯|S¯) and p(σ|S)): Moral hazard is less of an issue when the agent’s
performance is less noisy. As p(σ¯|S¯) increases, a positive report is more closely linked to the
project’s success, the project’s outcome tracks the expert’s effort more closely and the agency
cost is lower. In our model, a negative report implies that the project is not undertaken and its
outcome not observed. Therefore, p(σ|S) is irrelevant to incentive provision. Second, incentives
are less powerful when the expert can easily “guess” the signal to be positive without observing
it, i.e., when p(σ¯) is large. Hence, the rent increases with ν.
Finally, since the optimal contract is such that both moral hazard constraints (5) and (6) are
binding, the RHS of these two constraints must be equal. Hence we get the following property
which will be important to derive that of decreasing returns to scale due to agency costs.
3Demski and Sappington [7] discuss a model with information gathering (ex ante moral hazard) and production
(ex post moral hazard) where productive effort is costless. They show that the latter incentive problem does not
add any incentive cost in the case of two outcomes of the productive activity. Our result that adverse selection
ex post is not a binding constraint is similar.
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Corollary 1 For one expert to gather one signal, the optimal contract is such that if the expert
remained uninformed, he would be indifferent between reporting σ¯ and σ, i.e., νt¯1,1 = t1,10 .
Decision rule: Having characterized the optimal contract implementing the first-best decision
rule, we now optimize the rule itself. We focus on rules making an ex post optimal use of the
information available. (Section 7.2 studies ex post inefficient rules). Here, the only relevant
alternative to the first-best is never to do the project, which yields a zero payoff. Indeed,
from condition (1), this dominates always doing the project.4 Agency costs reduce the value of
gathering information: The principal will not hire an expert and will always reject the project
unless the signal’s value exceeds the sum of the cost ψ and the agency cost, i.e., unless
W 1,1 = θνS¯ + (1− θ)(1− ν)S − ψ − U1,1 > 0. (9)
4 One-Expert/Two-Signals
We show that with one expert collecting two signals, decreasing returns to scale obtain.
4.1 Model
Assume now that the expert can gather simultaneously two signals, (σ1, σ2) ∈ {σ, σ¯}2, that are
independently distributed, and have the same precision θ and cost ψ. (Section 8 discusses the
sequential case). Hence the cost of gathering two signals is twice that of gathering one signal,
i.e., we assume constant returns to scale for the information gathering technology.
Denote p(σ1, σ2) the probability of observing (σ1, σ2) and ν(σ1, σ2) the conditional proba-
bility of success, e.g., p(σ¯, σ¯) = θ2ν + (1− θ)2(1− ν) and ν(σ¯, σ¯) = θ2νθ2ν+(1−θ)2(1−ν) .
Doing the project is efficient only if both signals are positive. Indeed, with conflicting signals,
Bayesian updating leaves the prior unchanged (i.e. ν(σ¯, σ) = ν), and the status quo is efficient.
First-best decision rule: Gathering two signals is efficient if:
−θ(1− θ)(νS¯ + (1− ν)S) ≥ ψ. (10)
The LHS is the benefit of a second signal: rejecting the project when the second signal contradicts
a first positive one, i.e., with probability p(σ¯, σ) = θ(1− θ). The RHS is the cost of that signal.
4.2 Diseconomies of Scale due to Agency Costs
An incentive scheme specifies a decision rule and transfers depending on the project’s outcome
and both reports σˆ1 and σˆ2. However, not all such contracts are feasible. Indeed, when at least
4 In this section, we consider a one-dimensional signal, reducing this set means never undertaking the project
and increasing this set means always undertaking the project. Section 4 shows than when the expert gathers a
multidimensional signal, the decision rule can be distorted in a less trivial way. See also Malcomson [33].
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one report is negative, the status quo is efficient. Hence all transfers when σˆ1 = σ or σˆ2 = σ must
be equal. Otherwise, the expert would always make the report yielding the highest transfer.
Lemma 2 With one expert gathering two signals, contracts must be outcome-based, i.e., trans-
fers are contingent only on the project’s outcome (success/failure/rejection), not on the reports.5
Denote t0 the common transfer for all report pairs yielding the status quo, and t¯ that if the
project is undertaken and succeeds. Three other adverse selection incentive constraints must be
considered. First, the expert should prefer reporting (σ¯, σ¯) when this is what he observed,
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0. (11)
Conversely, the expert should not prefer reporting (σ¯, σ¯) after observing conflicting signals,
t0 ≥ ν(σ¯, σ)t¯, (12)
or two negative signals,
t0 ≥ ν(σ, σ)t¯. (13)
The expert should not prefer remaining uninformed:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − 2ψ ≥ max{t0, νt¯}, (14)
which can easily be shown to imply constraints (11) and (13). Compared to the one-signal case,
the expert has the new alternative to gather and base his report on only one signal, hence the
new moral hazard incentive constraint:6
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − 2ψ ≥ p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ. (15)
We now solve the principal’s problem below:
min
{t¯,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 subject to (12), (14) and (15).
Let t1,2, t¯1,2, t1,20 and U
1,2 denote the optimal transfers and rent.
Lemma 3 For one expert to gather two signals, the optimal incentive contract is:
t1,2 = 0,
νθ(2− θ)
1− p(σ, σ) t¯
1,2 = t1,20 =
(2− θ)ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)(1− θ) .
5This property does not hold in more general models. See Section 7.1.
6The RHS should be p(σ¯)max{t0, ν(σ¯)t¯}+ p(σ)max{t0, ν(σ)t¯}−ψ. However, constraint (14) supersedes both
the case in which t0 > ν(σ¯)t¯ and that in which t0 < ν(σ)t¯. Indeed, if t0 > ν(σ¯)t¯ this expression is equal to t0
which is the first argument on the RHS of constraint (14) and if t0 < ν(σ)t¯, it is equal to νt¯ which is the second
argument on the RHS of constraint (14). Note also that the expert’s moral hazard and limited liability constraints
imply his participation constraint, p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − 2ψ ≥ 0.
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The logic is as in the one-signal case. The expert is rewarded for reporting good news only
if it is confirmed by the project’s success. The status quo is also rewarded to elicit bad news.
Proposition 1 The expert’s rent in the optimal contract is:
U1,2 =
ψ















Delegation to one expert implies diseconomies of scale due to agency costs: U1,2 > 2U1,1.
The problem of gathering two signals can be decomposed into that of gathering a first (infra-
marginal) signal, and that of gathering a second (marginal) one. For the expert to gather the
first signal, he must be given the infra-marginal rent U1,1 as in the one-signal case. This is the
first term of the expression. To understand the second term, consider now the expert having
gathered (but not yet observed) one signal and deciding whether to collect another. If the first
signal turns out to be negative, the project is rejected irrespective of the second signal. Hence
the second signal is pivotal only if the first one is positive, which occurs with probability p(σ¯).
Given this signal, the incentive problem is as in the one-signal case except that the probabilities
must be conditioned on σ¯.
The rent for the marginal signal exceeds that for the infra-marginal signal for two reasons.
First, the second signal is useful only with probability p(σ¯). Second, the rent decreases with how
informative success is about the expert having observed σ¯. But conditional on having observed
σ1 = σ¯, success is less informative about σ2, i.e., p(σ¯|S¯, σ¯) − p(σ¯ |σ¯) < p(σ¯|S¯) − p(σ¯). Agency
costs of inducing an expert to gather two signals are strictly more than twice that of inducing
him to gather only one signal. Hence, agency costs imply diseconomies of scale.
This result being central to our analysis, we develop its intuition. Consider moral hazard
incentive constraint (15), i.e., the expert must prefer collecting two signals rather than one.
Step 1: Absent constraints (12) and (15), the two-signal model is only a special case of the
one-signal model. Indeed, the two-dimensional signal Σ = (σ1, σ2) takes only two relevant values:
either Σ = Σ¯ = (σ¯, σ¯) and the project is undertaken, or Σ = Σ ∈ {(σ¯, σ), (σ, σ¯), (σ, σ)} and it is
rejected. Hence, the two-signal model maps into the one-signal model, with cost 2ψ rather than
ψ, and precisions p(Σ¯|S¯) = θ2 and p(Σ|S) = 1− (1− θ)2 rather than p(σ¯|S¯) = p(σ|S) = θ. In




(1− ν)(2θ − 1) = 2U
1,1.
Moreover, by Corollary 1, constraint (12) is satisfied. In conclusion, absent constraint (15)
constant returns to scale would obtain.
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Step 2: Consider the optimal contract absent constraint (15). Suppose the expert has
collected (but not yet observed) σ1 and is wondering whether to collect σ2 or extrapolate from
σ1 and report Σ = (σ1, σ1), i.e., report Σ¯ if σ1 = σ¯ and Σ if σ1 = σ. The only reason for
collecting σ2 is if this sometimes leads him to change his report. If σ2 = σ1, the expert sticks to
Σ = (σ1, σ1). If σ2 6= σ1, the expert is back to his prior belief (i.e., ν(σ¯, σ) = ν), in which case
he is indifferent between reporting Σ¯ or Σ (Corollary 1) and might as well stick to Σ = (σ1, σ1).
But if the expert is not going to use σ2, there is no point paying ψ to collect it. Hence, constraint
(15) is violated, which implies decreasing returns to scale.
This intuition can be generalized. In particular, the decreasing returns to scale property
does not rely on the outcome not being observed if the project is rejected (see Section 7.1).
Decision rule: The principal induces the expert to gather a signal when its value exceeds
the sum of the cost ψ and the agency cost. Therefore, he induces the expert to gather (at least)
one signal if condition (9) holds, and also a second one only if
−θ(1− θ)(νS¯ + (1− ν)S) ≥ ψ + U
1,1
1− θ . (17)
Hence an optimal way of reducing agency costs can involve distorting the decision rule.
Corollary 2 With one expert, the principal can find it optimal to distort the decision rule by
having the expert gather only one signal even if two signals are first-best optimal.
5 Two-Experts/Two-Signals: No Collusion
Consider now two experts, A and B, privately observing one signal each. We focus on the
case where the experts make simultaneous reports, not knowing the other’s effort, signal, or
report. The main result is that the principal’s ability to cross-check the experts’ reports implies
increasing returns to scale, which in turn means that the two-expert organization is optimal.
5.1 Optimal Contracts
Without loss of generality, we assume that both experts receive the same contract. Each expert
receives t¯ if the project succeeds. Note that, unlike in the one-expert case, transfers can depend
on how the status quo is reached: With conflicting reports, the expert reporting good (resp.
bad) news receives tG (resp. tB), and each expert receives t0 when both news are bad.
When deviating from the proposed equilibrium strategy, each expert believes that the other
one sticks to the obedient equilibrium strategy. Hence the Bayesian adverse selection incentive
compatibility constraint if an expert observes σ¯ is:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)tG ≥ p(σ¯|σ¯)tB + p(σ|σ¯)t0. (18)
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When the expert observes σ, the constraint is:
p(σ¯|σ)tB + p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ)tG. (19)
An expert’s moral hazard incentive constraint is now:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+p(σ¯, σ)(tG+tB)+p(σ, σ)t0−ψ ≥ max{p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+p(σ)tG, p(σ¯)tB+p(σ)t0}. (20)
The adverse selection incentive constraints are implied by those of moral hazard, and are omit-
ted henceforth, as is each expert’s participation constraint p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)(tG + tB) +
p(σ, σ)t0 − ψ ≥ 0. Finally, the relevant limited liability constraints are:
tG, tB ≥ 0. (21)
The principal’s program is:
min
{t¯,tG,tB ,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)(tG + tB) + p(σ, σ)t0 subject to (20) and (21).
Denote t2,2, t2,2G , t
2,2
B , t¯
2,2, t2,20 and U
2,2 the optimal transfers and rent.
Lemma 4 Absent collusion, for two experts to gather one signal each, the optimal symmetric
incentive contract is report-based, i.e., transfers are contingent not only on the project’s outcome
but also on the reports. It punishes experts for conflicting reports. The optimal transfers are:
t2,2 = t2,2G = t
2,2
B = 0, t¯
2,2 =
p(σ)ψ
ν(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ2
, and t2,20 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ . (22)
As in the one-expert/one-signal case, the principal can use the project’s outcome to check
a positive report: Following such a report, the expert is rewarded only when the project (is
undertaken and) succeeds (t2,2 = t2,2G = 0). Now, however, the principal has an instrument to
check a negative report as well: Because the signals are correlated, following a negative report,
the expert is rewarded only when the other expert’s report is also negative (t2,2B = 0).
7
5.2 Economies of Scale due to Agency Costs
The principal’s ability to cross-check the experts’ reports allows him to motivate each expert at
a lower cost than in the one-expert/one-signal case.
Proposition 2 Assume that collusion is not possible.
• In the optimal contract, each expert’s rent is:
U2,2 =
ψ¡
p(σ¯ | S¯)− p(σ¯)¢+ (p(σ1 = σ | σ2 = σ)− p(σ1 = σ)) = p(σ)ψ(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ . (23)
7This is essentially an application of Holmström [18] and Mookherjee [34].
13
• Delegation to two experts implies economies of scale due to agency costs: 2U2,2 < 2U1,1.
• The two-expert organization is optimal: 2U2,2 < U1,2.
The rent is as in the one-expert/one-signal case, except that now the principal can use not
only the correlation between σ¯ and S¯ to check the expert’s report if it is positive, but also that
between σ1 = σ and σ2 = σ to check the expert’s report if it is negative. Note that thanks
to this second instrument, each expert’s rent is less than in the one-expert/one-signal case, i.e.,
there are economies of scale due to agency costs. This implies that the two-expert dominates
the one-expert organization because 2U2,2 < 2U1,1 < U1,2.
Note that report-based contracts have two more degrees of freedom than outcome-based
contracts: Neither tG nor tB need equal t0. The optimal contract uses both degrees of freedom,
but for different reasons. Setting tG = 0 allows the principal to focus the reward of an expert
reporting σ¯ on the state that is most informative about his being informed, i.e., the project’s
success. Since the principal can also do so in the one-expert/one-signal case, this is not generating
increasing returns to scale, i.e., under the constraint that tB = t0, constant returns to scale would
obtain. Setting tB = 0 allows the principal to cross-check the experts’ negative reports. It is this
instrument, unavailable in the one-expert/one-signal case, that generates economies of scale.
Decision rule: With two experts, the principal prefers having two signals if:
W 2,2 = θ2νS¯ + (1− θ)2(1− ν)S − 2ψ − 2U2,2 > W 1,1. (24)
Agency costs being less than with a single expert, the principal relies more often on a second
signal when deciding whether to undertake the project.
Corollary 3 Absent collusion, the principal finds it less often optimal to distort the decision
rule by relying on a single signal than when only one expert is available.
6 Collusion and the Organization of Delegated Expertise
We now introduce the possibility of ex ante and ex post horizontal collusion between experts,
and of vertical collusion between the principal and each expert. We characterize the optimal
organization of delegated expertise in different collusion environments.
6.1 Ex ante Horizontal Collusion
A problem with the optimal report-based contract is that it admits other less desirable equilibria.
If expert B remains uninformed and reports bad news, expert A’s best response is to do the
same. Indeed, even if he observed a good signal A would never report it since conflicting reports
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are punished. As a result, A is better off remaining uninformed and reporting bad news. Hence
an equilibrium exists in which both experts always report bad news, and get a payoff t2,20 that
strictly exceeds U2,2. Similarly, another equilibrium exists in which experts always report good
news. In this equilibrium, each expert’s payoff, νt¯2,2, exceeds U2,2 but is less than t2,20 . Note
that in both these equilibria the principal’s payoff is negative. In the first one, although the
project is never undertaken, the principal bears the cost of paying the experts. In the second
one, he also bears that of undertaking a negative-value project.
Although reached non-cooperatively, these outcomes can be viewed as collusive since the
experts are better off than by behaving obediently and truthfully.8 Hence, following most of the
literature, we look for contracts immune to non-obedient and non-truthful pure strategy equi-
libria. For brevity, we only report the main results of this analysis (developed in the Appendix).
As the two experts’s contracts can differ, we denote U i∗ the optimal rent of expert i ∈ {A,B}.
Proposition 3 To implement the first-best decision rule under ex ante horizontal collusion:
• The optimal collusion-proof contract is asymmetric between the experts whose rents are:
UA∗ =
ψ
p(σ¯|S¯, σ¯)− p(σ¯ |σ¯) and U
B∗ = U2,2.
• The two-expert organization is optimal: UA∗ + UB∗ < U1,2.
The intuition is simple. The principal must induce at least one expert to deviate from the
putative collusive equilibria in which the experts remain uninformed and report (σ, σ), (σ¯, σ¯),
(σ¯, σ) or (σ, σ¯). Because the optimal contract absent collusion punishes conflicting reports,
it will induce expert B to deviate from (σ¯, σ) and (σ, σ¯) irrespective of expert A’s contract.
Inducing expert A to deviate from (σ, σ) requires setting t0 < tG which optimally achieved by
setting t0 = 0 and tG > 0 arbitrarily small. But now expert A is rewarded only conditional on
expert B reporting σ¯, hence the expression of UA∗.
Now recall that U1,2 is the sum of the rent for an infra-marginal signal and that for a marginal
one. Since UB∗ is as in the no-collusion case, it is less than the rent for an infra-marginal signal.
Note that UA∗ is less than the rent for the marginal signal (i.e. it is that rent times p(σ¯)). Indeed,
in both cases the expert is rewarded only conditional on the other signal being σ¯. However, here
the fact that incurring ψ is useful only with probability p(σ¯) does not increase the rent because
the principal can simply scale up the transfers. Hence UA∗ = ψ(1−ν(σ¯))(2θ−1) . This is not possible
in the one-expert/two-signal case without distorting the incentive to collect the infra-marginal
signal, and the corresponding rent is ψ(1−ν(σ¯))(2θ−1) . Overall, this implies that U
A∗+UB∗ < U1,2.
8Demski and Sappington [6] present an adverse selection model with a cross-checking mechanism not immune
to collusive (non-cooperative) outcomes which are non-truthful. Our non-cooperative equilibrium comes from the
moral hazard stage.
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6.2 Ex post Horizontal Collusion
Consider now ex post horizontal collusion: Having collected signals, experts can jointly manipu-
late their reports and exchange side-transfers. This type of collusion arises when communication
between the experts cannot be controlled perfectly by the principal. Following the literature,
we assume that experts can credibly share their information and collude by making their jointly
optimal reports and exchanging side-transfers (Baron and Besanko [4] calls a similar assumption
internally verifiable information) and that side-contracts are enforceable (Tirole [39]).9
Once the experts have gathered the signals, they make reports maximizing their joint-payoff.
Therefore, a contract is robust to ex post horizontal collusion between the experts if and only if
it satisfies the following horizontal coalition-incentive constraints:10
2t0 = tG + tB, (25)
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0, (26)
t0 ≥ νt¯. (27)
Constraint (25) reflects the principal’s inability to distinguish between all pairs of reports
yielding the status quo. Given constraint (25), constraint (26) means that the experts must be
jointly better off recommending to undertake the project when they have observed two positive
signals. Similarly, given constraint (25), constraint (27) means that the experts must be jointly
better off recommending to reject the project when they have observed at least one negative
signal. Clearly, the optimal report-based contract of Lemma 4 violates constraint (25).
For brevity, we only report the main results of this analysis (developed in the Appendix).
Proposition 4 Under ex post horizontal collusion, ∀ν ∈ [0, 1], ∃θ∗(ν) ∈ [1/2, 1] with θ∗(ν)
strictly increasing with ν, θ∗(0) > 1/2 and θ∗(1) = 1 and such that:
• For θ ≤ θ∗(ν), the one-expert organization is optimal.
• For θ ≥ θ∗(ν), the two-expert organization is optimal.
6.3 Vertical Collusion
Consider now vertical collusion between the principal and each expert. If both reports are
negative, the principal should pay t0 to each expert. He would be better off bribing one expert
into switching to a positive report, and thus avoid paying the other expert.
9Credible disclosure may stem from a fellow expert being less easily fooled than the principal. Moreover experts
have incentives to disclose their signals truthfully to each other in any report-based contract punishing conflicting
reports. This may also justify our focus on credible disclosure to analyze collusion in more general mechanisms.
With credible disclosure, we characterize an upper bound on the effect of ex post horizontal collusion.
10These conditions are easily derived from the coalition incentive constraints: 2ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ max{t1 + t2, 2t0},
2t0 ≥ max{t1+ t2, 2ν(σ, σ)t¯}, and t1+ t2 ≥ max{2t0, 2νt¯}. Note also that the experts’ side payments satisfy their
limited liability constraints.
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Note that vertical collusion is relevant only when it leaves the decision unchanged. Given
a contract, vertical collusion might lead to a decision change. However, such a contract would
never be considered in the first place, i.e., absent collusion, as the principal would be better off
with a single signal or none. As a corollary, vertical collusion is relevant only when the project
must be rejected: When both signals are positive, changing a report changes the decision.
A contract is robust to vertical collusion between the principal and each expert if and only
if it is own-report-based, i.e., satisfies the following vertical coalition incentive constraint :
tB = t0. (28)
We denote U2,2,v each expert’s rent in the optimal contract.
Proposition 5 Under vertical collusion:
• Delegation to two experts implies constant returns to scale due to agency costs: U2,2,v =
U1,1.
• The two-expert organization is optimal: 2U2,2,v < U1,2.
In the no-collusion case, the increasing returns to scale stem from the principal being able to
cross-check the experts’ negative signals, which requires setting tB 6= t0 (see Section 5). Absent
this possibility, the principal cannot provide each expert with more powerful incentives than in
the one-expert/one-signal model. Vertical collusion rules out cross-checking and the associated
increasing returns, and only constant returns obtain. Since vertical collusion arises when the
principal cannot publicly release the experts’ reports, our analysis implies that increasing returns
to scale rely on the principal’s ability to publicize the experts’ reports.
6.4 Vertical and Horizontal Collusion: Outcome-Based Contracts
Finally, assume that both ex post horizontal and vertical collusion are possible. This case is
relevant since, once vertical collusion has been fought and the principal publicly releases the
experts’ reports, they can coordinate their messages ex post.
From conditions (25) and (28), a contract is robust to ex post horizontal and vertical collusion
if and only if it is outcome-based, i.e.,
t0 = tG = tB. (29)
Denote t2,2,vh, t2,2,vhG , t
2,2,vh
B , t¯
2,2,vh, t2,2,vh0 and U
2,2,vh the optimal transfers and rent.
Proposition 6 Under ex post horizontal and vertical collusion, the optimal collusion-proof con-
tract implementing the first-best decision rule is such that:
t¯2,2,vh =
ψ/p(σ¯)




(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1) .
17





p(σ¯|S¯, σ¯)− p(σ¯ |σ¯)¢ = 11− θU1,1.
The one-expert organization is optimal: 2U2,2,vh > U1,2.
Each expert’s rent corresponds to the second term in expression (16)’s RHS, i.e., the rent left
to a single expert for the marginal signal. The intuition is as follows. First note that the contract
space, i.e., that of outcome-based contracts, is the same as in the one-expert/two-signals case.
Second, with two experts and outcome-based contracts, in equilibrium, each expert expects the
other one to gather and report his signal. Therefore, each of the two experts behaves as if he
were gathering the marginal signal, and must be given the corresponding rent.
Recall the decreasing returns to scale property of the one-expert/two-signal case. The rent
needed for the expert to gather and report the marginal signal exceeds that for the infra-marginal
signal. Since both experts need to be given the larger rent corresponding to the marginal signal,
the ranking of organizations obtained absent collusion (Proposition 2) is reversed.
Outcome-based contracts although a priori attractive because immune to all forms of col-
lusion, increase agency costs too much. However, using a single expert allows the principal to
suppress the scope for vertical collusion. Note also that given vertical collusion, any departure
from constant returns to scale can be seen as arising from the possibility of horizontal collusion,
e.g., due to the principal’s inability to control communication between experts.
7 Extensions
7.1 Symmetric Case
This section relaxes the assumption that if the project is rejected, its outcome is not observed.
Instead, we assume that it is observed with an exogenous probability ε > 0.11 We refer to this
model as the “symmetric” case because the outcome is (possibly) observed whether the project
is undertaken or not, and to the model analyzed previously as the “asymmetric” case. The rest
of the section proves the following result.
Proposition 7 Consider the symmetric case.
• In the two-experts/two-signal case, giving each expert the optimal contract of the one-
expert/one-signal case is an optimal contract absent collusion that is also robust to horizontal
and/or vertical collusion.
11The analysis is unchanged if the two outcomes are observed with different probabilities.
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• The two-expert organization is optimal under (i) no collusion, (ii) ex ante horizontal collu-
sion, (iii) ex post horizontal collusion, (iv) vertical collusion, and (v) both horizontal and vertical
collusion.
7.1.1 One-Expert/One-Signal
A contract inducing the expert to collect and report the signal specifies transfers t(σˆ,X) where
X ∈ {∅, S, S¯} is the project’s outcome, ∅ denoting the case in which project is rejected and its
outcome not observed. We assume (and prove in the Appendix) that all transfers but t(σ¯, S¯)
and t(σ, S) are equal to zero. The intuition is as before: The expert’s rewards should be linked
with the outcomes most informative about his having gathered information. We can thus focus
on two (expected) transfers which we denote t¯ ≡ t(σ¯, S¯) and τ ≡ ε× t(σ, S).
The contract is subject to moral hazard incentive constraints:
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)(1− ν(σ))τ − ψ ≥ max{(1− ν)τ , νt¯}. (30)
As before, these constraints imply the adverse selection, participation and limited liability con-
straints (omitted here), and are binding at the optimum.
Lemma 5 In the optimal contract for the one-expert/one-signal case, the expert’s rent is:
U1,1 = νt¯1,1 = (1− ν)τ1,1 = ψ¡
p(σ¯ | S¯)− p(σ¯)¢+ (p(σ | S)− p(σ)) = ψ2θ − 1 . (31)
As in the asymmetric case, the principal can use the project’s success to check a positive
report. Here, however, he has a second instrument: He can also use the project’s failure to check
a negative report. Therefore, Lemma 5 simply generalizes expression (8).
7.1.2 One-Expert/Two-Signals
We show that the decreasing returns to scale still obtain, and extend our two-step intuition.
An incentive scheme must specify a decision rule and the expert’s transfer depending on the
project’s outcome as well as his two reports σˆ1 and σˆ2, i.e., t(σˆ1, σˆ2,X). As before, we assume
that all transfers but t(σ¯, σ¯, S¯), t(σ, σ¯, S¯), t(σ, σ¯, S), and t(σ, σ, S) are equal to zero, and denote
t¯ ≡ t(σ¯, σ¯, S¯), τ1 ≡ ε× t(σ, σ¯, S¯), τ2 ≡ ε× t(σ, σ¯, S), and τ ≡ ε× t(σ, σ, S).
The expert should prefer reporting (σ¯, σ¯) if this is what he observed rather than reporting
conflicting or two negative signals:
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ max{ν(σ¯, σ¯)τ1 + (1− ν(σ¯, σ¯))τ2, (1− ν(σ¯, σ¯))τ}. (32)
The contract must also satisfy two other similar adverse selection constraints:
ντ1 + (1− ν)τ2 ≥ max{νt¯, (1− ν)τ}, (33)
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and
(1− ν(σ, σ))τ ≥ max{ν(σ, σ)t¯, ν(σ, σ)τ1 + (1− ν(σ, σ))τ2}. (34)
Moreover, the expert must neither prefer remaining uninformed:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+2p(σ¯, σ) (ντ1 + (1− ν)τ2)+p(σ, σ)(1−ν(σ, σ))τ−2ψ ≥ max{νt¯, (1−ν)τ , ντ1+(1−ν)τ2}
(35)
nor prefer gathering and basing his report on only one signal:





p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)(1− ν(σ))τ − ψ,
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ) (ν(σ)τ1 + (1− ν(σ))τ2)− ψ,




Lemma 6 In an optimal contract for the one-expert/two-signals case, the expert’s rent is:
U1,2 =
ψ¡
















Delegated expertise to one expert exhibits diseconomies of scale due to agency costs: U1,2 > 2U1,1.
This result simply generalizes Proposition 1 and can be understood with a similar but more
general two-step intuition. Ignore the moral hazard incentive constraint (36), i.e., the expert
must prefer collecting two signals rather than one.
Step 1: Assume that the principal gives the expert two independent contracts for collecting
the two signals, each contract being the optimal one for the one-expert/one-signal case, i.e.,
t¯ = 2t¯1,1, τ = 2τ1,1, τ1 = τ2 = t¯1,1+ τ1,1. This scheme satisfies the adverse selection constraints
(32) to (34). It also satisfies the moral hazard constraint (35) with equality, i.e., the expert
is indifferent between gathering two signals and none (and making any report). Hence, absent
constraint (36), the expert’s rent would be 2U1,1, i.e., there would be constant returns to scale.
Step 2: The optimal contract absent constraint (36) satisfies Corollary 1. Hence, as in the
asymmetric case, the expert is never strictly better off using the second signal, and therefore will
not pay ψ to collect it: Constraint (36) is violated, which implies decreasing returns to scale.
7.1.3 Two-Experts/Two-Signals
We show that the increasing returns to scale property no longer holds.
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Lemma 7 Irrespective of the collusion environment, delegation to two experts implies constant
returns to scale (2U2,2 = 2U1,1) and the two-expert organization is optimal (2U2,2 < U1,2).
The intuition for this result is simple. In our model, the information contained in an expert’s
report about the signal observed by the other expert is redundant if the project’s outcome is
observed. Hence, the principal need not condition an expert’s (expected) reward on the other
expert’s report. He can simply give each expert the optimal contract of the one-expert/one-
signal case. This rules out cross-checking and therefore increasing returns to scale.12 Finally,
the optimal contracts being independent and implementing ex post efficient decision rules, there
is no scope for horizontal or vertical collusion.
7.1.4 Properties
We conclude with two properties that will simplify the analysis in the next section. These can
be proved by inspection of the agency costs in different cases.
Lemma 8 In all cases, the agency costs in the symmetric case (ε > 0) are (i) independent of ε
and (ii) strictly less than in the asymmetric case with ex post efficient decision rules (ε = 0).
Point (i) reflects the fact that the principal and the experts’ payoffs (and therefore their
incentives) depend on expected transfers contingent on report and outcome. The expected
transfers can always be kept constant through a decrease in ε by a corresponding scaling up of
the transfers. Point (ii) reflects the fact that in all cases, the principal can use more or better
instruments to check the experts’ reports.
7.2 Asymmetric Case: Ex post Inefficient Decision Rules
Our analysis of the asymmetric case has focused on rules that use the information available
efficiently. Beyond the usual motivation based on renegotiation-proofness, this focus allowed us
to avoid distinguishing the effects of vertical collusion from those of renegotiation. However,
a growing literature studies how committing to a distorted use of information can be part of
an optimal incentive scheme for information gathering (e.g., Gerardi and Yariv [12]). In this
section, we relax this assumption and characterize the optimal organization. We assume that
the principal can commit to undertaking the project with probability ε > 0 when it is efficient
to reject it, ε being a choice variable.13
12Note that if the signals’ conditional distributions were not independent, cross-checking would remain useful
and imply increasing returns to scale in the symmetric case, albeit less than in the asymmetric case.
13More generally, the project could be undertaken with different probabilities depending on the reports. We
ignore this possibility for brevity. It is easily checked that this shortcut does not affect the results.
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Proposition 8 Consider the asymmetric case with ex post inefficient decision rules.
• In the two-experts/two-signals case, setting ε > 0 arbitrarily close to zero and giving each
expert the optimal contract of the one-expert/one-signal symmetric case is an optimal contract
absent collusion that is also robust to horizontal collusion but not to vertical collusion.
• Under vertical collusion and both horizontal and vertical collusion, it is optimal to set ε = 0
and to give the experts the contracts of the asymmetric case with ex post efficient decision rules.
• The two-expert organization is optimal under (i) no collusion, (ii) ex ante horizontal col-
lusion, (iii) ex post horizontal collusion, (iv) vertical collusion. The one-expert organization is
optimal under (v) both horizontal and vertical collusion.
For a given ε > 0, the set of feasible contracts is as in the symmetric case where if the project
is rejected, its outcome is observed with probability ε > 0. Therefore the rent that must be left
to the expert(s) is also as in the symmetric case. Hence, we can use Lemma 8 to understand
the principal’s optimization problem. Point (i) implies that if the principal is going to set ε > 0,
he should make it as small as possible so as to minimize inefficiencies. Doing so, the principal’s
payoff is arbitrarily close to that in the symmetric case. Point (ii) implies that the rent for ε > 0
is always less than for ε = 0. Taken together, these remarks imply that whenever possible, the
principal will set ε > 0 and arbitrarily close to zero. The rest of the analysis is straightforward.
Absent collusion, the analysis is as in the symmetric case. Since horizontal collusion does not
preclude ε > 0, its analysis is again as in the symmetric case. Vertical collusion implying ex
post efficient decision rules, i.e., ε = 0, its analysis is as in the asymmetric case with ex post
efficient rules (Sections 6.3 and 6.4).
8 Conclusion
We have characterized the optimal incentive contracts for experts and the optimal organiza-
tion of delegated expertise in different collusion environments. With a single expert, adverse
selection restricts the set of feasible contracts, leading to returns to scale due to agency costs.
Absent collusion, a two-expert organization is optimal. Indeed, it relaxes some adverse selection
constraints, which increases the set of feasible contracts, leading to lower agency costs. However,
this organization is prone to horizontal and vertical collusion, which reduce the set of feasible
contracts. When both are possible, a one-expert organization is optimal.
In our model, different sets of feasible contracts correspond to different possibilities of col-
lusion. As we have emphasized, these various nexi of collusion themselves can arise from limits
in the control of communication between experts and between experts and the principal. An
alternative interpretation of the different sets of feasible contracts is that they correspond to
different departures from complete contracting. Our analysis shows that optimal collusion-proof
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contracts are relatively simple so that they can be interpreted as being incomplete.
Our analysis has abstracted from a number of technical and conceptual issues.
We have assumed that the signals were acquired simultaneously. This fits situations in which
the principal cannot control the timing of reports or time constraints make sequential learning
impossible. This timing allows for a simpler presentation of the interaction between the expert’s
two tasks. An earlier draft studied sequential information gathering (Gromb and Martimort
[14]). The main difference with the simultaneous case is that, given our focus on ex post efficient
decision rules, the second signal is collected only if the first report is positive. In particular,
this implies that the agency cost for the second signal equals that of the simultaneous case but
weighted by the probability that the first signal is positive. These differences notwithstanding,
contracting issues are similar and, while the optimal contracts are different, the main results of
the simultaneous case carry over to the sequential case.
We have assumed experts to be unbiased and to respond only to monetary incentives. Biases
are an important concern for experts. In Political Science for instance, lobbyists are often
viewed as biased experts eager to influence decision-makers (Laux [29], Dur and Swank [11]).
Biased experts can be modeled by introducing non-transferable private benefits contingent on the
outcome (Baliga and Sjöstrom [2]). These benefits would provide part of the expert’s incentives
to gather information. If the expert is a priori biased in favor of the project, inducing him to
gather positive (resp. negative) signals is easier (resp. harder). These biases would affect the
incentive problems but not our qualitative results.
We have assumed the expert’s degree of expertise to be set and known. Situations in which
the expert is privately informed about his skill (Osband [36]) or learns about it with experience
(Dequiedt, Gromb and Martimort [8]) constitute interesting avenues of research.
In our model, a contracting externality arises between two signal-gathering tasks. One could
study externalities arising between information-gathering and other tasks. For instance, should
the planning of a project and its implementation be separated or centralized (Hirao [17], Lewis
and Sappington [30], Laux [29], Khalil, Kim and Shin [23], Jeon [22])? Our approach, and
particularly our study of collusion, could be applied to these questions.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We do not impose t = 0. The principal’s problem is then:
min
{t¯,t,t0}
p(σ¯)(ν(σ¯)t¯+ (1− ν(σ¯))t) + p(σ)t0
subject to








t ≥ 0. (41)
The expert’s participation and limited liability constraints
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ 0, and t¯, t0 ≥ 0 (42)
are easily shown to be satisfied, and omitted henceforth. Since ν(σ¯) > ν(σ), one can keep the
expected transfer constant and (39) unchanged, and relax (40) by reducing t. Hence (41) is
binding. The remaining constraints, (39) and (40), define a cone in the positive quadrant of the
(t0, t¯) space, and the optimum is reached at its origin, i.e., (39) and (40) are binding.
Proof of Lemma 3: (15) can be written as:
(1− p(σ¯, σ¯)− p(σ))t0 ≥ (p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)− p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)) t¯+ ψ, (43)
which can be written as
p(σ¯, σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯, σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ ψ, (44)





which implies (12) (and, incidentally, (13)). Since (45) implies that t0 > νt¯, (14) boils down to:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − 2ψ ≥ t0, (46)
which following similar calculations, can be written as:




Hence (45) and (47) define a cone in the positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space, and the optimum
is reached at its extreme point.
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Proof of Lemma 4: The moral hazard incentive constraint can be rewritten as:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)tG ≥ p(σ¯|σ¯)tB + p(σ|σ¯)t0 + ψp(σ¯) , (48)
and
p(σ¯|σ)tB + p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ|σ)tG + ψp(σ) . (49)
Consider first the following problem: For a given value TG of p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)tG, keeping
both the LHS of (48) and the expected transfer unchanged, what is the value of tG minimizing





TG = p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)tG (50)
tG ≥ 0. (51)




p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)(TG − p(σ|σ¯)tG) + p(σ|σ)tG subject to (51).
The coefficient of tG in this problem is p(σ|σ) − p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯,σ)p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯,σ¯)p(σ|σ¯) = (2θ−1)νp(σ) > 0 and thus the
minimum is obtained when (51) is binding. Similarly, consider the following problem: For a
given value TB of p(σ¯|σ)tB + p(σ|σ)t0 keeping both the LHS of (49) and the expected transfer





TB = p(σ¯|σ)tB + p(σ|σ)t0 (52)
tB ≥ 0. (53)
This problem can be rewritten as:
min
{tB}
p(σ¯|σ¯)tB + p(σ|σ¯)p(σ|σ)(TB − p(σ¯|σ)tB) subject to (53).
The coefficient of tB in this problem is p(σ¯|σ¯) − p(σ|σ¯)p(σ|σ)p(σ¯|σ) = (2θ−1)
2ν(1−ν)
p(σ¯)p(σ,σ) > 0 and thus the




p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ, σ)t0
subject to





These two constraints define a cone in the positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space and the optimum
is reached at its extreme point. Simple manipulations complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, note that the collusive equilibria arising in the optimal contract
absent collusion are strict, i.e., cannot be eliminated by a small deviation from the optimal
contract. Second, since the experts do not observe each other’s effort, standard implementation
techniques used for moral hazard contexts (e.g. Ma [31]) cannot be used to eliminate unwanted
equilibria. However, we use a similar approach, detailed below. Third, outcomes in which only
one expert is informed are not an issue: The only reason the expert would gather information
would be to report it, but in that case, the other expert’s moral hazard constraint ensures that
he does the same. Hence, in potential unwanted pure strategy equilibria, the experts remain
uninformed and report (σ, σ), (σ¯, σ¯), (σ¯, σ) or (σ, σ¯).
Since the two experts can receive different contracts, we index the transfers by A or B. We
rule out unwanted pure strategy equilibria by ensuring that at least one expert strictly prefers
deviating. Given such a putative equilibrium, two deviations are possible: Either an expert
prefers to remain uninformed but make a different report or an expert prefers to collect and





















A + p(σ)tAB − ψ
ª
> νt¯A or max
©
tBB, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯











> tAG or max
©











> tBG or max
©
νt¯A, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯A + p(σ)tAB − ψ
ª
>tAB. (58)
For example, (55) states that at least one expert must prefer deviating from (σ, σ). Expert
i ∈ {A,B} could deviate by remaining uninformed and reporting σ¯. In that case, his payoff
would be tiG. Alternatively, he could deviate by acquiring and reporting a signal, in which case
his payoff would be p(σ¯)tiG + p(σ)t
i
0 − ψ. The other constraints correspond to deviations from
(σ¯, σ¯) or (σ¯, σ), and (σ, σ¯) respectively. Note that the same expert’s contract cannot satisfy both
the inequalities in (55) and (57) or both those in (56) and (58). Therefore, the optimal scheme
must be asymmetric.
Denote ti∗, ti∗G, t
i∗
B , t¯
i∗ and ti∗0 the optimal transfers for expert i ∈ {A,B}. The inequalities
in (55)-(58) being strict, the feasible contract set is open and an optimal contract might not
be properly defined. We will nevertheless abuse notation and call optimal the solution of the
principal’s problem when strict inequalities are replaced by weak ones with the proviso that
indifferences can be broken with infinitesimal changes in the transfers. We write t = x+ to mean
that t is larger and arbitrarily close to x.
Note that p(σ¯)tiG+ p(σ)t
i
0 −ψ > ti0 implies tiG > ti0. Hence (55) can be rewritten as tiG > ti0.







p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯A + p(σ¯, σ)(tAG + t
A




subject to the limited liability constraints, A’s moral hazard incentive constraint (20) and the
deviating condition (55) that will now be taken as a weak inequality: tAG ≥ tA0 . Absent (55), the




¢+. Inserting tAG = tA0 into (20) yields:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯A + p(σ¯, σ)tAB − ψ ≥ max{p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯A, p(σ¯)tAB}. (59)
This constraint does not depend on tA0 , which is set at zero to minimize the objective (i.e., the















(1− ν)(2θ − 1)(1− θ) .
A few remarks complete the proof. First, tAB > νt¯
A so that A’s contract satisfies the inequality
in (56). Second, the same expert cannot satisfy both the inequalities in (55) and (57) or both
those in (56) and (58). Hence, the optimal scheme must have expert A’s contract satisfy the
inequality in (55) and (56), and expert B’s satisfy those in (57) and (58). Third, this implies
that A’s contract is the solution to the restricted problem above, while B’s contract must be the
optimal contract absent collusion as it satisfies the inequalities in (57) and (58). Finally, UA∗
obtains from (20) being binding.
Proof of Proposition 4: Given (25), the principal’s problem is:
min
(t¯,t0,tG,tB)
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0
subject to (25), (26), (27) and each expert’s moral hazard incentive constraint (20), which can
be written as:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − ψ ≥ p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)tG (60)
and
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − ψ ≥ p(σ¯)(2t0 − tG) + p(σ)t0. (61)
First, (60) can be rewritten as:
(1− p(σ¯, σ¯)− 2p(σ))t0 − p(σ) (2t0 − tG) ≥ ψ + (p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)− p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)) t¯, (62)
which is violated for tG = 2t0 because (1 − p(σ¯, σ¯)) − 2p(σ) = p(σ, σ¯) − p(σ) < 0. Hence, the
constraint tG ≤ 2t0 (i.e., tB ≥ 0) is slack. For now, we ignore the constraint tG ≥ 0 and check
later that it holds. Second, (60) is the only remaining upper bound for tG. Since tG is not in
the principal’s objective, (60) is binding. Replacing tG in (61) yields:






Third, as the only lower bound for t0, (27) must be binding, i.e., t0 = νt¯. This implies that (26)
is slack. Next, as the only lower bound for t¯, (61) must be binding. This yields the transfers in
the Lemma. Finally, we check that tG ≥ 0. From (60), we have:
p(σ)tG = − (p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)− p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)) t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − ψ (64)
=
[θ (1− θ) + (1− (1− ν)(2θ − 1)) p(σ)]ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)p(σ) > 0 (65)




and U2,2,h the optimal transfers and rent, we have the optimal transfers:
νt¯2,2,h = t2,2,h0 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)p(σ) ,
t2,2,hG =
(1− (1− ν) (2θ − 1) p(σ¯))ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)p(σ) and t
2,2,h
B =
(1 + (1− ν) (2θ − 1) p(σ¯))ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)p(σ) .
and the corresponding rent for each expert:
U2,2,h =
(1 + (1− ν) (2θ − 1)p(σ¯))ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)p(σ) .




G > 0. The optimal contract remains report-based but the
principal can no longer fully punish conflicting reports because 2t0 = tG + tB must hold. The
intuition for this ranking is as follows. On the one hand, tG and tB must be somewhat even.
Minimizing tG (setting tG = 0) would mean maximizing tB (setting tB = 2t0). The expert would
be tempted not to gather information and always recommend rejecting the project. Correcting
this bias would require increasing t¯. Similarly, minimizing tB would bias the expert in favor of
the project and require increasing t0. On the other hand, other things being equal, increasing t¯
is less costly than increasing t0 because the former transfer is contingent on a more informative
outcome. Therefore, it is optimal to depart from tG = tB and increase tB.
The two-expert organization is optimal if and only if U1,2 ≥ 2U2,2,h.
U1,2 − 2U2,2,h = N(ν, θ)
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)(1− θ)p(σ)ψ (66)
where the numerator is:
N(ν, θ) ≡ 2(2θ − 1)2(1− θ)ν2 − (2θ − 1)(−6θ2 + 9θ − 2)ν − θ(4θ2 − 9θ + 4). (67)
For all θ, N(ν, θ) < 0 if and only if ν ∈ (ν1(θ), ν2(θ)) where:
ν1(θ) =
−6θ2 + 9θ − 2−
q
4(1− θ3)(1− θ) + θ2
4(2θ − 1)(1− θ) (68)
ν2(θ) =
−6θ2 + 9θ − 2 +
q
4(1− θ3)(1− θ) + θ2
4(2θ − 1)(1− θ) (69)
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We need to determine whether and when ν1(θ) and ν2(θ) are within (0, 1). For all θ ∈ [1/2, 1],
N(1, θ) = −θ(1− θ) ≤ 0, which implies ν2(θ) ≥ 1. Hence, for all θ ∈ [1/2, 1], N(ν, θ) < 0 if and
only if ν < ν∗(θ) ≡ max{0, ν1(θ)} ∈ [0, 1].
Now, notice that for all ν ∈ (0, 1), N(ν, 1/2) = −1/4 < 0 and N(ν, 1) = 1− ν > 0. Showing
that dν1(θ)dθ > 0 would complete the proof. Indeed, this would imply ∃θ0 ∈ (1/2, 1) such that
ν∗(θ) is a strictly increasing one-to-one mapping between [θ0, 1] and [0, 1] so that θ∗ ≡ (ν∗)−1
would be as stated in the proposition.
We now prove that dν1(θ)dθ > 0 over [1/2, 1]. Define the following functions over [1/2, 1]:
f(θ) ≡ 10− 21θ + 2θ2
¡
3 + 6θ − 4θ2
¢
and g(θ) ≡ (4θ − 3)
q






4(2θ − 1)2(1− θ)2
q
4(1− θ) + (2θ − 1)θ2
. (71)
To show that f(θ)+ g(θ) > 0, we study the sign of f(θ) and g(θ) over [1/2, 1]. Clearly, g(θ) ≥ 0
if and only if θ ∈ [3/4, 1]. We have:
f 0(θ) = −21 + 12θ + 36θ2 − 32θ3 and f 00(θ) = 12
¡
1 + 6θ − 8θ2
¢
. (72)
Since f 00(θ) = 0 for θ1 = 3−
√
17




8 ∈ (3/4, 1), we have maxθ∈[1/2,1] f 0(θ) =
f 0(θ2) = −4.4 < 0. Hence f 0 < 0 over [1/2, 1]. Note that f(0.77) > 0 and f(1) < 0.
Case 1: θ ∈ [1/2, 3/4]. Since f(θ) > 0, f(θ)2 > g(θ)2 implies dν1(θ)dθ > 0. We have:
f(θ)2 − g(θ)2 = 8(1− θ)2
¡
8− 20θ + θ2 + 36θ3 − 26θ4 − 8θ5 + 8θ6
¢
. (73)
Hence, we only need to show that h(θ) ≡ f(θ)
2−g(θ)2
8(1−θ)2 > 0 for all θ ∈ [1/2, 3/4]. We have:
h0(θ) = −2
¡


















¢3´ < 8.7, we have for all θ ∈ [1/2, 3/4],
h0(θ) < −2
∙





Hence, minθ∈[1/2,3/4] h(θ) = h(3/4) > 0.
Case 2: θ ∈ [3/4, 0.77]. Both f(θ) > 0 and g(θ) > 0, implying dν1(θ)dθ > 0.
Case 3: θ ∈ [0.77, 1]. A sufficient condition for dν1(θ)dθ > 0 is h < 0. We have:
h00(θ) = −2
¡





−27 + 78θ + 60θ2 − 120θ3
¢
and h0000(θ) = −16
¡
39 + 60θ − 180θ2
¢
(77)
argminθ∈[0,1] h0000(θ) = 1/6 < 0.77. Hence minθ∈[0.77,1] h0000(θ) = h0000(0.77) = 344 > 0. Hence h00
is convex over [0.77, 1] and maxθ∈[0.77,1] h00(θ) = max{h00(0.77), h00(1)} = max{−5.3,−14} < 0.
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Hence maxθ∈[0.77,1] h0(θ) = h0(0.77) = −2.97 < 0. Hence maxθ∈[0.77,1] h(θ) = h(0.77) = −0.01 <
0.
Proof of Proposition 5: The optimal transfers t2,2,v, t2,2,vG , t
2,2,v
B , t¯
2,2,v and t2,2,v0 solve:
min
{t¯,tG,tB ,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+p(σ¯, σ)(tG+tB)+p(σ, σ)t0 subject to (18), (19), (20), (21) and (28).
Given tB = t0, (20) can be written as:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯|σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)tG ≥ t0 + ψp(σ¯) , (78)
and
t0 ≥ p(σ|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ¯|σ¯)t0 + ψp(σ¯) . (79)
(18) and (19) are obtained by eliminating the terms in ψ. Clearly, for a given expected value of
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯|σ¯)t¯ + p(σ|σ¯)tG, setting tG = 0 relaxes (79). From this, it is straightforward to show
that the optimal collusion-proof contract implementing the first-best decision rule is such that :
t¯2,2,v =
ψ
ν(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ , t
2,2,v
G = 0, U




(1− ν)(2θ − 1) = U
1,1.
Proof of Proposition 6: Each expert’s moral hazard constraint can now be written as:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − ψ ≥ max{t0, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0}, (80)
which is easily shown to imply constraint (26), and the adverse selection constraints. (80) can
be written as two constraints defining a cone in the positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space:




(1− p(σ¯, σ¯)− p(σ))t0 ≥ (p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)− p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯))t¯+ ψ. (82)
The optimum is reached at the cone’s origin.
Proof of Lemma 5: Denote t ≡ t(σ¯, S), τ¯ ≡ ε × t(σ, S¯), t0 ≡ (1 − ε) × t(σ,∅), T¯ ≡
ν(σ¯)t¯+ (1− ν(σ¯))t and T ≡ (ν(σ)τ¯ + (1− ν(σ))τ) + t0. The principal’s problem is:
min
T¯≥0,T≥0
p (σ¯) T¯ + p(σ)T
subject to adverse selection incentive constraints:
T¯ ≥ T + (ν(σ¯)− ν(σ))(τ¯ − τ) and T ≥ T¯ − (ν(σ¯)− ν(σ))(t¯− t), (83)
which are implied by the moral hazard incentive constraints:
T¯ ≥ ψ
p (σ¯)
+ T + (ν(σ¯)− ν(σ))(τ¯ − τ), (84)
T ≥ ψ
p (σ)
+ T¯ − (ν(σ¯)− ν(σ))(t¯− t). (85)
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Holding T¯ fixed, (85) is relaxed when t¯ is maximized and t minimized. Hence t = 0 is optimal.
Holding T fixed, (84) is relaxed when τ is maximized and τ¯ minimized. Hence τ¯ = 0 is optimal.
Moreover, minimizing t0 allows to increase τ , further relaxing (84). Hence t0 = 0 is optimal.
With this in mind, (84) and (85) are binding and can be rewritten as:
p (σ¯) ν(σ¯)t¯ = ψ + p (σ¯) (1− ν(σ¯))τ (86)
p (σ) (1− ν(σ))τ = ψ + p (σ) ν(σ)t¯, (87)
which yields the optimal transfers τ1,1 and t¯1,1, and rent U1,1:
U1,1 = νt¯1,1 = (1− ν)τ1,1 = ψ
2θ − 1 . (88)
Proof of Lemma 6: For brevity, we assume but do not prove that in the optimal contract,
t(σˆ1, σˆ2,∅) = 0, because observing the outcome is more informative, and t(σ¯, σ¯, S) = t(σ, σ, S¯) =
0, because the expert should not be rewarded when the outcome contradicts both his reports.
Constraint (35)’s third term can be written as:
θ2νt¯+ 2θ(1− θ)(ντ1 + (1− ν)τ2) + θ2(1− ν)τ − 2ψ ≥ ντ1 + (1− ν)τ2, (89)
and constraint (36)’s first term can be written as:
θ2νt¯+ 2θ(1− θ)(ντ1 + (1− ν)τ2) + θ2(1− ν)τ − 2ψ ≥ θνt¯+ θ(1− ν)τ − ψ. (90)
With the notation T ≡ νt¯+(1−ν)τ and Tˆ ≡ ντ1+(1−ν)τ2 and ignoring for now all constraints





2T + 2θ(1− θ)Tˆ
θ2T ≥ 2ψ + (1− 2θ + 2θ2)Tˆ
2θ(1− θ)Tˆ ≥ ψ + θ(1− θ)T
Both constraints are binding at the optimum:
T =
1 + 2θ(1− θ)
θ(1− θ)(2θ − 1)ψ and U
1,2 = Tˆ =
(2− θ)
(1− θ)(2θ − 1)ψ. (91)












Proof of Lemma 7: Consider an incentive scheme such that the project is undertaken with
probability ε(σˆ1, σˆ2) after reports (σˆ1, σˆ2), and such that expert i’s transfer ti(σˆi, σˆj ,X) is con-
tingent on the reports and the project’s outcome. For brevity, we assume but do not prove that
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in the optimal contract, t(σˆi, σˆj ,∅) = 0 and t(σ¯, σˆ, S) = t(σ, σˆ, S¯) = 0. Denoting t¯ ≡ t(σ¯, σ¯, S¯),
τG = ε× t(σ¯, σ, S¯), τB = ε× t(σ, σ¯, S), and τ = ε× t(σ, σ, S), and T¯ ≡ ν (θt¯+ (1− θ) τG) and







subject to the following adverse selection incentive constraints:
θT¯ ≥ (1− θ)T and θT ≥ (1− θ) T¯ , (92)









− ψ ≥ T . (93)
Hence both constraints in (93) are binding at the optimum so that T¯ = T = ψ2θ−1 , each expert’s
rent equals T¯ , and any contract with non negative transfers satisfying the following equalities is
optimal:
ν (θt¯+ (1− θ) τG) = (1− ν) (θτ + (1− θ) τB) =
ψ
2θ − 1 . (94)
In particular, the optimal contract of the one-expert/one-signal case, t¯ = τG = ψν(2θ−1) and
τ = τB = ψ(1−ν)(2θ−1) , satisfies (94) and is robust to both ex ante and ex post horizontal
collusion as it involves bilateral principal-expert contracts (i.e., t¯ = τG and t = τB).
34
